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THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT AND 
BANKRUPTCY—FDCPA CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE BARRED BY THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Katey M. Garrett* 
 
Bankruptcy is among the oldest of consumer protections.  It is a 
safeguard vital to both the economy and the individuals who seek to 
file bankruptcy.  During bankruptcy, a debtor often suffers from 
shame, depression, and anxiety, and seeks a fresh start as a last resort.  
With the advancement of technology, ruthless debt collectors have 
grown increasingly aggressive.  The Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act was enacted in 1977 in response to debt collection conduct to 
protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, or misleading acts or 
practices in connection with attempts to collect debts.  One year later, 
bankruptcy laws were reformed when the Bankruptcy Code was 
enacted in 1978.  Debtors in bankruptcy are much more vulnerable 
than the average debtor, and therefore should be afforded additional 
protection where the FDCPA allows.  This Note proposes that during 
bankruptcy, debtors should not be limited to relief under the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, Congress has employed creative mechanisms to achieve 
its longstanding goals to protect consumers.1  But long before the proposal 
and enactment of consumer-friendly statutes such as the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (hereinafter FDCPA) and the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act (hereinafter CCPA), the framers of the United States 
Constitution “virtually copied” the English approach to bankruptcies.2  As 
 
*  B.A., Legal Studies, Bay Path University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, Western New England 
University, 2017.  I would like to thank Professor Justin H. Dion for being an invaluable mentor 
throughout these crazy eight years—I couldn’t have done it without you.  Mom—Thank you 
for being an inspiration and always encouraging me to make my dreams a reality.  I wouldn’t 
have done it without you.  Lastly, thank you to the 2016 WNEU Law Review Staff for helping 
me transform my Note into something I am proud of. 
1.  See Michael D. Sousa, A Circuits Split Does the Bankruptcy Code Implicitly Repeal 
the FDCPA, AM. BANKR. INST. J. (Oct. 2006), http://www.abi.org/abi-journal/a-circuits-split-
does-the-bankruptcy-code-implicitly-repeal-the-fdcpa. 
2.  Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7 (1995). 
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originally enacted, English bankruptcy laws were meant to “aid creditors 
in the collection of debts,” but have adapted and changed over time to shift 
some of the protection to debtors.3  Over the years, bankruptcy laws have 
been challenged based on provisions that conflict with many other laws 
and policies.4 
While bankruptcy laws were shifting protection to the debtor, 
Congress also sought to reform laws protecting consumer rights.5  In 1968, 
Congress enacted the CCPA to protect consumers by requiring fair and 
honest credit practices.6  Eleven years later, the FDCPA was enacted as 
an extension of the CCPA in 1977.7 
For decades, courts faced the tremendous task of determining how 
the FDCPA interacts with federal bankruptcy laws.8  More recently, courts 
have struggled to decide whether FDCPA claims are allowed during 
stages of bankruptcy where a debtor is already protected by the 
Bankruptcy Code.9 
This Note will argue FDCPA claims should not be banned merely 
because a debtor has entered bankruptcy.  Parts I.A and I.B will first 
discuss the history and connections between the FDCPA and the 
Bankruptcy Code before providing a brief history of the circuit split that 
has developed over the years in Part I.C.  Part I.D will discuss the snowball 
effect that has emerged since a notable Eleventh Circuit decision in 2014.  
Part I.E will outline one of many hypothetical situations that illustrates 
how an alternative approach may put creditors at an unfair advantage if 
shielded from FDCPA liability while a debtor is in bankruptcy.  Part I will 
conclude with a proposed solution to the problem, which will be expanded 
upon in the following section. 
Part II of this Note will first identify the problems involved in a 
 
3.  Id. at 8.  “As commerce expanded, the need for a collective procedure to collect debts 
became evident.  Individual collection remedies . . . did not address the distinct problems 
presented by a debtor’s multiple defaults.  Creditors needed protection from defaulting debtors 
and from each other.”  Id. at 7.  
4.  Id. at 43.  Bankruptcy laws in the United States have had a long history of 
constitutional challenges, including problems with interstate commerce, uniformity, and 
preemption.  Id. 
5.  In 1968, Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), which 
requires meaningful disclosures of credit and personal property lease terms.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1693r (2015).  
6.  Id. 
7.  See S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 1 (1977).  The FDCPA is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–
1692p (2015). 
8.  Brittany M. Dant, Down the Rabbit Hole: Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC Upends 
the Role of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in Consumer Bankruptcy, 66 MERCER L. 
REV. 1067, 1071 (2015). 
9.  Id. at 1074–75. 
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preemption analysis in Part II.A before discussing an alternative approach 
for analyzing the issue.  Part II.B will argue that a preclusion analysis is 
more appropriate than a preemption analysis.  Part II.C will then apply the 
proposed approach to the two most frequently cited issues among courts, 
arguing the two statutes were intended to coexist and complement one 
another where appropriate.  Lastly, Part II.D will apply the proposed 
approach to the hypothetical illustrated in Part I.D.  This will reiterate the 
notion that the FDCPA should not be banned during bankruptcy by 
analyzing the outcome of a specific set of facts.  Part II of this Note will 
conclude with a brief recap of the problem, solution, and the reasoning 
behind the argument. 
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND A HISTORY OF THE 
CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. New Protections: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA,10 which prohibits the use of 
abusive, deceptive, and unfair acts or practices in connection with an 
attempt to collect a debt.11  The FDCPA covers only consumer debts and 
does not extend protection to commercial debts of any kind.12  The 
FDCPA governs communications between debt collectors and consumer 
debtors, third parties, and the consumer debtor’s spouse, parent (if the 
consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.13  FDCPA 
claims are only enforceable against debt collectors14 and do not apply to 
creditors.15 
Under the FDCPA, a debt collector must send the debtor a written 
validation notice within five days of the initial communication with a 
consumer.16  The validation notice informs the debtor of the amount of the 
 
10.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2015). 
11.  Id. 
12.  A “consumer” is defined as “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to 
pay any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (2015).  “Debt” is defined as “any obligation or alleged 
obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, 
insurance, or services . . . are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes . . . .”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2015). 
13.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2015). 
14.  A “debt collector” is defined by the FDCPA as “any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of 
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, direct or 
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 
(2015). 
15.  A “creditor” is defined by the FDCPA as “any person who offers or extends credit 
creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (2015). 
16.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2015). 
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debt, the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, and includes a 
statement of the consumer’s opportunity to object to the debt within thirty 
days.17  After the validation notice is sent, the consumer may notify the 
debt collector in writing within thirty days to dispute the debt.18 
In addition to the specific requirement that debt collectors send a 
written validation notice, the FDCPA also sets forth rules governing 
general communications between a debt collector and a consumer 
debtor.19  Unless the consumer gives express permission, a debt collector 
may not contact the debtor (or third parties) at unreasonable hours or20 at 
their place of employment,21 and may not contact a debtor directly when 
the debt collector knows the consumer debtor is represented by an attorney 
with respect to the debt.22 
The FDCPA is commonly referred to as a “strict liability statute” 
since it does not require the consumer to have suffered actual harm.23  To 
establish a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must make two showings: 
(1) the defendant is a debt collector,24 and (2) the collector engaged in an 
act or omission prohibited or required by the FDCPA in attempting to 
collect a debt.25  A debt collector in violation of the FDCPA is only 
protected from civil liability where the debt collector shows “that the 
violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error 
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to 
avoid any such error.”26  A plaintiff prevailing on an FDCPA claim may 
be entitled to statutory damages up to $1,000 with attorneys’ fees and 
 
17.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2015). 
18.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2015).  If a consumer disputes the debt within thirty days as 
required by the FDCPA, the debt collector must cease collection activity until the debt collector 
obtains verification of the debt.  Id. 
19.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2015). 
20.  The FDCPA prohibits contact with a consumer “at any unusual time or place or a 
time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.”  15 U.S.C.  
§ 1692c(a)(1) (2015).  Unless the debt collector has knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, 
it is assumed that the convenient time for communications are after nine o’clock a m. and before 
eight o’clock p m.  Id. 
21.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(3) (2015). 
22.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)–(b) (2015). 
23.  “The FDCPA does not ordinarily require proof of intentional violation and . . . is 
described by some as a strict liability statute.”  LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 
1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2015). 
24.  A “debt collector” is defined by the FDCPA as “any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of 
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, direct or 
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 
(2015). 
25.  15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2015). 
26.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2015). 
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court costs, as well as actual damages suffered due to illegal collection 
practices.27 
While the FDCPA explicitly acknowledges an inadequacy of existing 
laws governing abusive debt collection practices, Congress made no 
mention of the FDCPA’s relation to protections already afforded under 
the existing bankruptcy laws.28  In 1978, Congress reformed the 
bankruptcy laws and enacted the Bankruptcy Code, but again neglected to 
address how this would interfere with the FDCPA already in place.29 
B. The Birth of the Bankruptcy Code 
In 1898, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,30 exercising 
the authority granted in Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution.31  Congress amended the Act numerous times over the 
course of eighty years before its repeal in 1978.32  In 1978, Congress 
enacted the Bankruptcy Code (codified as Title 11 of the United States 
Code) as a replacement to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.33 
Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code34 aim to 
provide consumer debtors with a financial fresh start from burdensome 
debts.35  In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, a trustee takes control of 
the debtor’s nonexempt assets,36 liquidates them, and distributes payments 
to creditors from the bankruptcy estate.37  In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
proceeding, consumer debtors with a “regular income”38 develop and 
 
27.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2015). 
28.  Congress explicitly outlined congressional findings and declaration of purpose, 
noting that “[a]busive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal 
bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2015). 
29.  11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2015). 
30.  The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). 
31.  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
32.  The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
33.  11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784, §§ 1301–1330 (2015). 
34.  11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2015). 
35.  Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
36.  Under the Bankruptcy Code, debtors may exempt, or exclude, from the bankruptcy 
estate certain assets.  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2015).  For example, debtors may exempt an 
aggregate interest in real property used as a residence up to $23,675, up to $3,775 in interest in 
one motor vehicle, up to $600 in interest in household furnishings, and up to $1,600 in interest 
in jewelry held for personal use.  Id.  
37.  “The term ‘liquidation’ is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code but refers to a Chapter 
7 bankruptcy that provides for the administration, collection, and sale of a debtor’s assets by a 
bankruptcy trustee and the distribution of the proceeds, after administrative expenses, to pay 
creditors.”  Liquidation Definition, NORTON BANK. L. & PRAC. DICT. OF BANKR. TERMS (3d. 
ed. 2017).  Very few Chapter 7 cases contain assets, since the assets involved are usually 
exempt. Id. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704–726 (2015).  
38.  “The term ‘individual with regular income’ means [an] individual whose income is 
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propose a repayment plan over a maximum of five years,39 retaining 
possession of assets while completing the repayment plan.40 
In both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases, creditors41 are notified of the 
pending bankruptcy proceeding and are given the opportunity to take part 
in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate funds.42  In non-asset cases, 
there is no need for creditors to take part in the proceeding, as there are no 
funds to distribute.43  In asset cases, creditors may file a proof of claim or 
interest44 with the bankruptcy court, which gives the creditor the right to 
receive a share of the liquidated assets in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy or the 
right to receive payments under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.45  After proofs 
of claim are filed, debtors have the opportunity to object to proofs of claim 
that are unenforceable.46  A proof of claim or interest “is deemed allowed, 
unless a party in interest . . . objects.”47  The only creditors that share in 
the distribution of assets are those “whose claims have been allowed.”48 
In both types of cases, debtors are also given the protection of the 
automatic-stay provision, which prevents creditors from contacting 
 
sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan under 
chapter 13 of this title, other than a stockbroker or commodity broker.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(30) 
(2015). 
39.  The Bankruptcy Code provides the repayment plan in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy “may 
not provide for payments over a period that is longer than 5 years.”  11 U.S.C. §1322(d)(1)(C) 
(2015). 
40.  11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2015). 
41.  A “creditor” is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at 
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.”  11 U.S.C.  § 101(10) (2015).  
Creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding are divided into two categories.  A “secured creditor” is 
one that holds a secured claim, such as a lien on a property in which the estate has an interest.  
11 U.S.C. § 506 (2015).  An “unsecured creditor” is one that holds an unsecured claim, meaning 
that the value of the claim is subject to setoff.  Id. 
42.  11 U.S.C. § 501 (2015). 
43.  Not all bankruptcy petitions include assets to distribute.  An “asset case” is a 
bankruptcy where there is non-exempt property in the bankruptcy estate to distribute to 
creditors.  Liquidation Definition, NORTON BANK. L. & PRAC. DICT. OF BANKR. TERMS (3d ed. 
2017).  Alternatively, a “non-asset” case involves debtors who have no property at all or have 
used the exemptions outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2015).  Id.  See 11 U.S.C. § 704–726 (2015). 
44.  A “proof of claim” is defined as “a written statement setting forth a creditor’s claim.”  
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a). 
45.  11 U.S.C. § 501 (2015). 
46.  Proofs of claim are allowed unless a party in interest objects.  11 U.S.C. § 502(a) 
(2015).  Parties may object where claims are unenforceable, are for unmatured interest, or are 
not timely filed.  11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2015).  The Bankruptcy Code does not define “unmatured 
interest,” but courts have defined it as interest that is “not yet due and payable.”  Thrifty Oil Co. 
v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (March 
6, 2003) (citing Joyce v. Fid. Consumer Dis. Co. (In re Joyce), 41 B.R. 249, 254 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1984)). 
47.  11 U.S.C. § 502 (2015). 
48.  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3021. 
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debtors directly throughout the proceeding.49  Debtor individuals “injured 
by any willful violation of a stay . . . shall recover actual damages, 
including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, 
may recover punitive damages.”50  The automatic stay protects a debtor 
from the moment a petition is filed until the time the case is closed, 
dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied.51 
At the closing of a bankruptcy proceeding, a debtor is granted a 
discharge.52  In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a debtor is discharged from “all 
debts that arose before the date of the order for relief.”53  In Chapter 13 
cases, discharge occurs after the debtor completes all payments required 
by the repayment plan.54  After payments are completed, debtors are 
granted a discharge of “all debts provided for by the plan.”55 
At first glance, the Bankruptcy Code appears to provide debtors with 
adequate protection against creditor misconduct.  Where proofs of claim 
are invalid, debtors may object to prevent the allowance of the claim.56  
Under the automatic-stay provision, debtors are automatically protected 
from being contacted or pursued by creditors while the bankruptcy is 
pending.57  However, recent case law involving the Bankruptcy Code, as 
it relates to the FDCPA, provides clear indication debtors are in need of 
additional protections not provided for under the Bankruptcy Code.  
Congress’s failure to address the role of the FDCPA and its relation to the 
Bankruptcy Code has left courts in charge of connecting the dots, resulting 
in inconsistencies among jurisdictions.58  The next section of this Note 
will explore the history of the circuit split that evidences a need for 
 
49.  The automatic stay “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities” against the 
enforcement of the debt, commencement of a judicial, administrative, or other action, acts to 
obtain possession of the property of the estate, or any act to collect assess, or recover a claim 
against the debtor.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2015). 
50.  11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2015). 
51.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)–(c) (2015). 
52.  A “discharge in bankruptcy” is “[t]he release of a debtor from personal liability for 
prebankruptcy debts . . . .”  Discharge in Bankruptcy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
53.  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)–(b) (2015). 
54.  11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2015). 
55.  Id. 
56.  11 U.S.C. § 502(a)–(b) (2015). 
57.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)–(c) (2015). 
58.  The Second and Ninth Circuits hold FDCPA violations are precluded by the 
Bankruptcy Code. Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010); Walls 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 511 (9th Cir. 2002).  Alternatively, the Third, Seventh, 
and Eleventh Circuits allow for recovery under both federal statutes. Crawford v. LVNV 
Funding LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 126162 (11th Cir. 2014); Simon v. FIA Card Servs. N.A., 732 
F.3d 259, 271–74 (3rd Cir. 2013); Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730–33 (7th Cir. 
2004).   
48 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:041 
change. 
C. A History of the Circuit Split 
The circuits are split on the issue of whether FDCPA claims are 
allowed as a private cause of action during a bankruptcy proceeding.59  
Today, the Second and Ninth Circuits hold that the FDCPA does not apply 
in a bankruptcy context at all, as the debtor is already entitled to adequate 
relief and protection through the bankruptcy court.60  Alternatively, the 
Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits allow debtors to seek relief under 
both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA.61  Last year, the Fourth Circuit 
jumped on the majority bandwagon, holding that bankruptcy does not bar 
FDCPA claims.62 
The split as to whether the Bankruptcy Code generally precludes63 
claims brought under the FDCPA developed in the early 2000s.64  In 2002, 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether Wells Fargo Bank’s attempted debt 
collection during bankruptcy was actionable under the FDCPA and held 
that it was “not, as to do so would circumvent the Bankruptcy Code’s 
remedial scheme.”65  In Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Donna Marie 
Walls brought a class action lawsuit against Wells Fargo Bank after 
continuous solicitations to collect monthly payments “before [her] 
discharge but after the automatic stay” was issued.66  Walls argued a 
private cause of action under the FDCPA was consistent with the purposes 
of the Bankruptcy Code,67 and urged the Ninth Circuit to “read the two 
competing statutes jointly.”68  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that 
because Congress did not articulate the intent to allow debtors relief under 
both federal statutes, a separate private cause of action was not allowed 
 
59.  See generally Simmons, 622 F.3d at 93; Walls, 276 F.3d at 259; Simon, 732 F.3d at 
259; Randolph, 368 F.3d at 1254. 
60.  Walls, 276 F.3d at 510.  See also Simmons, 622 F.3d at 95. 
61.  See Simon, 732 F.3d at 271–74; Randolph, 368 F.3d at 730–33; Crawford, 758 F.3d 
at 1254, 1256–57. 
62.  In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 525 (4th Cir. 2016). 
63.  “Preclude” is defined as “[t]o prevent or make impossible; to rule out beforehand by 
necessary consequence.”  Preclude, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  To 
“preclude” is “to make impossible by necessary consequence.”  Preclude, MERRIAM WEBSTER 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).   
64.  Walls, 276 F.3d at 510; cf. Randolph 368 F.3d at 730–33. 
65.  Walls, 276 F.3d at 504. 
66.  Id. at 505. 
67.  “[T]he purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide debtors with a ‘fresh start’ and 
to protect them from subsequent collection efforts.”  Walls, 276 F.3d at 509. 
68.  Id. at 510.  [A]bsent . . . clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary,” 
the Supreme Court instructs courts to give effect to both laws where competing statutes are 
capable of coexisting.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984). 
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under the FDCPA.69 
Two years later, the Seventh Circuit considered the same issue, but 
under slightly different circumstances.70  In Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., three 
debtors filed suit under the FDCPA for false representation of a debt71 
after discharge had occurred.72  The Seventh Circuit began with an 
analysis of “the compatibility of overlapping systems[,]”73 and determined 
“[i]t would be better to recognize that the statutes overlap, each with 
coverage that the other lacks . . . .”74  The court ultimately held that 
FDCPA claims were not precluded by the Bankruptcy Code.75  However, 
because all three cases involved debt collectors who desisted all collection 
attempts immediately upon learning of the bankruptcy proceedings, the 
judgment was remanded for further review.76 
In 2010, the split grew when the Second Circuit considered whether 
a creditor’s filing of inflated proofs of claim during bankruptcy constituted 
a violation of the FDCPA.77  Without seeking remedies under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the debtors in Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC filed 
suit under the FDCPA.78  The Second Circuit failed to find language in 
either the Bankruptcy Code or the FDCPA that authorizes a debtor “to 
bypass the procedural safeguards in the Code in favor of asserting 
potentially more lucrative claims under the FDCPA”79 and held that the 
debtor was not entitled to relief under the FDCPA.80 
The Third Circuit wrote the next notable opinion on the issue in 
 
69.  “Nothing in either Act persuades us that Congress intended to allow debtors to bypass 
the [Bankruptcy] Code’s remedial scheme when it enacted the FDCPA.  While the FDCPA’s 
purpose is to avoid bankruptcy, if bankruptcy nevertheless occurs, the debtor’s protection and 
remedy remain under the Bankruptcy Code.”  Walls, 276 F.3d at 510 (citing Kokoszka v. 
Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974)). 
70.  See Randolph, 368 F.3d 726. 
71.  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2015). 
72.  The court in Randolph v. IMBS, Inc. consolidates the facts of three cases by using 
one set of facts as illustration.  Randolph, 368 F.3d at 728.  The court considered a Chapter 13 
debtor who has discharged a debt to her dentist.  Id.  Approximately two years after the debtor’s 
Chapter 13 plan was confirmed, her dentist died and his office hired a third party to collect on 
old accounts.  Id.  The third-party collection agency sent two collection letters, which the debtor 
relayed to her attorney.  Id. at 728–29. 
73.  Id. at 732. 
74.  Id. at 731. 
75.  Id. at 733. 
76.  Id.  
77.  See Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).  The proof of 
claim at issue in this case was considered “inflated” in that it misrepresented the amount of debt 
owed, claiming an amount of $2,039.21 when Simmons actually only owed $1,100.  Id. at 94–
95. 
78.  Id. at 96. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
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2013.81  In Simon v. FIA Card Services, N.A., the court considered whether 
a notice sent to a Chapter 7 debtor’s bankruptcy counsel gave rise to a 
claim under the FDCPA.82  The court first applied the FDCPA to the facts 
of the case and then addressed the relationship between the FDCPA and 
the Bankruptcy Code.83  In doing so, the Third Circuit followed the 
approach of the Seventh Circuit, holding when FDCPA claims arise 
during bankruptcy, “there is no categorical preclusion of the FDCPA 
claims.”84 
One year later, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a consumer 
debt buyer, who had filed an invalid proof of claim in a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy proceeding, was in violation of the FDCPA.85  In Crawford v. 
LVNV Funding, LLC, the court completely neglected to address the 
preemption or preclusion issue and instead analogized the filing of an 
invalid proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding to the filing of a stale 
lawsuit.86  Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that both actions rise to 
the level of an FDCPA violation.87 
Other circuit courts have taken the Crawford decision and ran in two 
opposite directions with it.88  Recently, many courts have considered the 
issue, citing the Eleventh Circuit as persuasive authority and have 
adopted, deviated from, or rejected it.89 
D. 2016 Decisions 
In 2016, three circuit courts considered the narrower issue of whether 
debtors can bring an FDCPA claim against debt collectors for filing stale 
proofs of claim in bankruptcy.90  The first decision came from the 
 
81.  See generally Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013). 
82.  Id.  The communications at issue in this case were “a debt collector’s letter and notice 
requesting an examination” of the debt and offering to settle the debt.  Id. at 262. 
83.  Id. at 278–80. 
84.  Id. at 274. 
85.  See generally Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 
2014).  In this case, the defendant attempted to collect a debt that was unenforceable in both 
state and federal court under a three-year Alabama statute of limitations that governed the debt.  
Id. 
86.  Id. at 1261.   
87.  Id.  The court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that the FDCPA prohibits the 
filing of stale lawsuits to collect consumer debts because: (1) “unsophisticated consumers” 
would not know about the statute of limitations defense; (2) would not remember “the 
circumstances and validity of the debt” after time has passed; and (3) would be highly unlikely 
to have maintained personal records.  Id. at 1260 (citing Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 
F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
88.  The recent decisions surrounding the issue are discussed in the next section of this 
Note. 
89.  Id. 
90.  See In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2016); Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 
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Crawford court, which considered whether Chapter 13 debtors had a claim 
under the FDCPA against a debt collector for filing a proof of claim for a 
debt that they knew to be time-barred.91  While the Bankruptcy Code 
“certainly allows all creditors to file proofs of claim in bankruptcy cases, 
the Code does not at the same time protect those creditors from all 
liability.”92 
In revisiting the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code issue, the Eleventh 
Circuit expanded upon the “preemption”93 issue “the district court artfully 
dodged” and the Crawford decision “decline[d] to weigh in on.”94  The 
Eleventh Circuit answered “the question left open in Crawford” and held 
that “[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not preclude an FDCPA claim in the 
context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy when a debt collector files a proof of 
claim it knows to be time-barred.”95  Rather, “[t]he FDCPA easily lies 
over the top of the Code’s regime, so as to provide an additional layer of 
protection against a particular kind of creditor.”96 
The Seventh Circuit revisited the issue months later under similar 
circumstances.97  In three consolidated cases, the court considered whether 
“filing a proof of claim on a stale debt violates §§ 1692e and 1692f of the 
[FDCPA].”98  Since the court previously held in Randolph that “the 
Bankruptcy Code d[oes] not implicitly repeal the FDCPA,” the court was 
now charged with determining “whether defendants’ attempts to collect 
on plaintiffs’ time-barred debts in bankruptcy were false, deceptive, or 
misleading under the FDCPA.”99  The court first referred to the Crawford 
decision, but declined to take the same approach.100  Noting that because 
“the concerns . . . regarding the misleading or deceptive nature of the 
conduct are less acute when a proof of claim is filed in bankruptcy, 
especially in a counseled case, as opposed to when a lawsuit is filed in 
state or federal court,” debtors—especially those with attorneys—don’t 
need any additional protection.101 
 
F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016); Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016). 
91.  Johnson, 823 F.3d at 1338. 
92.  Id. at 1336. 
93.  This Note will argue that the issue some courts label as “preemption” does not apply 
in this context.  See infra Part II.A. 
94.  Johnson, 823 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1262 n.7). 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. at 1341. 
97.  Owens, 832 F.3d at 734. 
98.  Id. at 729. 
99.  Id. at 734. 
100.  Id. at 735. 
101.  Id. 
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Proofs of claim are “required to inform the debtor about the age and 
origin of the debt,” which provides the debtor with an “affirmative 
defense . . . evident on the face of the claim.”102  The court explained that 
because most debtors hire attorneys, the correct standard is the “competent 
attorney” standard, which is “whether the communications would be 
likely to mislead a competent lawyer.”103  Ultimately, the court concluded 
that although FDCPA claims are not barred by the Bankruptcy Code, 
filing a stale proof of claim in bankruptcy is not deceptive or misleading 
and thus cannot form the basis for an FDCPA claim.104  That’s not to say 
a proof of claim could never form the basis for an FDCPA claim in the 
Seventh Circuit—just not in cases where the proof of claim is a “factual, 
true statement about the existence of a debt and the amount.”105 
Under a strikingly similar fact pattern to both 2016 cases above, In 
re Dubois considered whether proofs of claim filed on debts that were 
barred under Maryland’s statute of limitations entitled debtors to recover 
“damages, attorney’s fees, and costs under the FDCPA.”106  In the Fourth 
Circuit’s case of first impression, the court began with a broad overview 
of bankruptcy, the FDCPA, and each statute’s respective purpose.107  
Because “[f]ederal courts have consistently held that a debt collector 
violates the FDCPA by filing a lawsuit or threatening to file a lawsuit to 
collect a time-barred debt,” the court then looked to whether filing a proof 
of claim constitutes debt collection activity regulated by the FDCPA.108  
Although the debt collector argued that a proof of claim is only a “request 
to participate” in the bankruptcy proceeding, the court held that “does not 
alter [the] conclusion” that “a proof of claim is an attempt to collect a 
debt.”109 
The court then looked at the narrower issue of whether the proofs of 
claim for time-barred debts violated the FDCPA.110  When the word 
“claim” is used in bankruptcy, “it is usually referring to a right to payment 
recognized under state law.”111 Maryland does not interpret the expiration 
of a statute of limitations to extinguish a debt, but rather, interprets it as 
 
102.  Id. at 735–36. 
103.  Id. at 736 (citing Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 812 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 
2016). 
104.  Id.  
105.  Id. 
106.  In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 525 (4th Cir. 2016). 
107.  Id. at 526. 
108.  Id. at 527. 
109.  Id. at 529. 
110.  Id. at 528. 
111.  Id. at 529 (quoting Traveler’s Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. V. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 
U.S. 443, 451 (2007). 
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simply barring recovery under the law.112  The debt collector can still 
contact a debtor to try to collect a debt and in many states, if a debt 
collector secures payment on a stale debt, the debt is revived and the 
statute of limitations is no longer a valid defense.113  Citing to Crawford, 
the court analogized the filing of a stale proof of claim to filing a stale 
lawsuit, but ultimately held that filing a proof of claim on a stale debt is 
not an FDCPA violation.114  The Eleventh Circuit distinguished claims for 
stale debts in court from claims for stale debts in bankruptcy, determining 
that a debtor pays the same amount into the estate regardless of whether 
the proof of claim has been allowed, so relief is not necessary.115 
With more and more circuits citing to Crawford as persuasive 
authority, the United States Supreme Court has decided to weigh in.116  In 
October of 2016, certiorari was granted to Johnson v. Midland Funding, 
the missing piece of the Crawford puzzle.117  The timing indicates the 
Supreme Court is eager to do one of two things: (1) jump on the Crawford 
bandwagon and eradicate the circuit split; or (2) extinguish the Crawford 
wildfire and ban FDCPA claims from bankruptcy altogether.  While 
Crawford comes to the correct conclusion, it discusses only a fraction of 
the reasoning that leads to that conclusion.  This gap in reasoning leads to 
inconsistencies in application among circuits and unpredictability within 
the courts.  The next section will discuss how inconsistencies among 
jurisdictions preclude relief where a debtor is in need of additional 
protection. 
E. A Practical Application: A Hypothetical to Illustrate the Need for 
Change 
Betty118 is overwhelmed with anxiety and debt after some unexpected 
health complications forced her to “max out” her credit cards and spend 
the last bit of her savings.  After months of struggling to keep up with the 
minimum payments, Betty is laid off from work.  For months, she is 
unable to pay her creditors anything at all and is harassed by debt 
collectors around the clock.  She borrows against her retirement plan to 
barely keep a roof over her head and food on the table. 
Betty searches desperately for a job, but finds very few openings in 
 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. at 533. 
115.  Id. at 531–32. 
116.  Petition for Certiorari, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348 (2016). 
117.  Id. 
118.  Betty is a hypothetical character developed for the purpose of demonstrating the 
harmful effects of disallowing FDCPA claims while in bankruptcy.  She is completely fictional 
and not based on any real person. 
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her field of employment.  After not working for nine months, she finds a 
job with decent pay and great benefits.  She comes home from her second 
day of work to find the usual pile of bills in her mailbox, but in addition, 
she finds a notice of the foreclosure proceeding against her.  Betty is 
devastated she may lose the childhood home her mother devised to her, so 
she immediately seeks the advice of a family friend who is also an 
attorney.  She decides to file Chapter 13 bankruptcy in order to keep her 
home, as she now has a steady source of income to repay her debts on a 
payment plan. 
Because of her income, Betty’s Chapter 13 payment plan will repay 
her secured debts in full over a span of five years.119  Eager to use all of 
her money to pay off her debts as soon as possible, she does not hire an 
attorney.  After her 341 Hearing,120 Betty notices in her paperwork that 
two of her secured creditors121 list a claim for exactly the same amount.  
Further investigation reveals the claims are duplicative; her creditor had 
sold the debt to a third-party debt collector and then proceeded to file a 
proof of claim122 to collect on that same debt.  She finds an old bill and 
discovers the debt was incurred over eight years ago, rendering the debt 
unenforceable under a three-year state statute of limitations.  Betty is 
unsure of her rights and does not know how to dispute the debt because, 
under the Bankruptcy Rules, she no longer has the right to object to an 
invalid proof of claim.123  As Betty’s case is under the jurisdiction of the 
Ninth Circuit, she is also unable to seek recovery under the FDCPA.124 
F. FDCPA Claims are Not Barred by the Bankruptcy Code 
Barring FDCPA claims while a debtor is in bankruptcy shields debt 
collectors from liability for “abusive, deceptive, and unfair” acts and 
 
119.  The Bankruptcy Code provides that the repayment plan in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 
“may not provide for payments over a period that is longer than 5 years.”  11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) 
(2015). 
120.  11 U.S.C. § 341 (2015).  Under the Bankruptcy Code, the United States trustee has 
the authority to convene a meeting of any equity security holders.  At this meeting (typically 
referred to as a “341 Meeting”), a debtor is required to appear and submit to an examination 
under oath.  Creditors, indenture trustees, or any trustee or examiner in the case may examine 
the debtor.  11 U.S.C. §§ 341–43 (2012).  See also An Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–
598, 92 Stat. 2549 (establishing a uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies). 
121.  A “secured claim” is “a claim held by a creditor who has a lien or a right of setoff 
against the debtor’s property.”  Secured Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
122.  A “proof of claim” or interest is defined as “a written statement setting forth a 
creditor’s claim.”  FED. R. BANKR. R. 3001. 
123.  Under the Bankruptcy Rules, objections to claims must be “in writing and filed” 
and “[a] copy of the objection with notice of the hearing thereon [must] be mailed or . . . 
delivered to the claimant, the debtor or debtor in possession, and the trustee at least 30 days 
prior to the hearing.”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007(a). 
124.  Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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practices in connection with an attempt to collect a debt.125  To adopt this 
approach is not only inconsistent with the strict liability mechanism 
Congress imposed in the FDCPA,126 but also inconsistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code, which operates to bring all of the rights and duties of 
debtors and creditors together and distribute assets equally in one 
proceeding.127 
Rather than finding claim preclusion where FDCPA claims arise in 
bankruptcy proceedings, courts should allow for relief under both federal 
statutes, when both apply, since the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code are 
not in conflict and fully capable of coexisting.128  Further, the FDCPA 
provides a debtor with additional relief where the Bankruptcy Code does 
not, which if prohibited, would deprive a debtor of relief and put a 
bankrupt debtor at an unfair disadvantage.129 
II. APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS UNDER THE CORRECT 
STANDARD 
A. Preemption Argument is Inapplicable 
Many courts, including circuit courts, have phrased the issue of 
whether FDCPA claims are barred by the Bankruptcy Code in the context 
of preemption.130  “Preemption” is defined as “[t]he principle (derived 
from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant 
any inconsistent state law or regulation.”131  While the preemption 
doctrine governs when federal law may override state law, it fails to 
provide any guidance when the allegedly conflicting statutes are both 
federal.132  Since both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA are federal 
statutes, as the court in Randolph v. IMBS Inc. acknowledged, the 
preemption analysis is inappropriate.133  Instead, just as the Seventh 
 
125.  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2015). 
126.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2015). 
127.  See Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 320–21 (1931). 
128.  See infra Part II.A. 
129.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2015). 
130.  See generally Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Walls, v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002); cf. Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 
368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding the correct question to consider in this circumstance 
is whether implicit repeal has occurred, rather than whether one statute preempts another); see 
Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) (neglecting the preemption 
issue altogether since counsel did not raise the issue). 
131.  Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
132.  11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112 (2015); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2015). 
133.  In Randolph, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s holding that section 
362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code “preempts” section 1692e(2)(a) of the FDCPA, noting “this 
cannot be right.  One federal statute does not preempt another.”  Randolph, 368 F.3d at 729 
56 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:041 
Circuit did, courts should consider whether one federal statute precludes 
relief under the other.134 
B. Preclusion Analysis 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that as a “cardinal 
principle” of statutory construction, when there are two federal laws on 
the same subject, “the rule is to give effect to both if possible.”135  
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was correct in considering “whether one 
[statute] implicitly repeals the other” rather than phrasing the issue in 
terms of preemption.136 
Implicit repeal may occur in one of two ways.137  The “two well-
settled categories of repeals by implication” are: “(1) [w]here provisions 
in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict. . . ; and (2) if the later act 
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a 
substitute . . . .”138  There is an important distinction to note between these 
two categories: the first type allows for repeal of only the conflicting 
provisions, but the second type constitutes an implied repeal of the entire 
original act, causing the new act to replace or substitute the original.139  In 
both circumstances, in order for repeal by implication to occur, “[t]he 
intention of the legislature to repeal ‘must be clear and manifest[.]’”140 
With regard to the second type of repeal by implication, the later act 
must cover the “the whole subject of the earlier one and [be] clearly 
intended as a substitute” before the later act will be construed as a 
substitute that implicitly repeals the earlier act.141  The FDCPA (the earlier 
act) and the Bankruptcy Code (the later act) arguably cover entirely 
different subjects.142  Even if both statutes fall within the broader subject 
of consumer protection, it cannot be argued the Bankruptcy Code covers 
the whole subject matter of the FDCPA.143  Further, before implicit repeal 
 
(citing Baker v. IBP Inc., 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
134.  To “preclude” is “to make impossible by necessary consequence.”   Preclude, 
MERRIAM WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).  See infra Part II.A and II.B. 
135.  United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). 
136.  Randolph, 368 F.3d at 729 (citing Brand v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)). 
137.  See Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id.  Since the Bankruptcy Code (the later act) does not cover the entire subject of 
the FDCPA (the earlier act), this Note will address the first type only. 
140.  Borden Co., 308 U.S. at 198 (quoting Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 601–02 
(1883)). 
141.  Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503. 
142.  The Bankruptcy Code governs bankruptcies, while the FDCPA governs “abusive, 
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.”  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112 (2015); 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1692a (2015). 
143.  The Bankruptcy Code contains provisions that govern debt collection during 
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may occur, the intention of the legislature to repeal the later statute must 
be clear and manifest.144  In fact, it contains express language indicating 
Congress intended for the Bankruptcy Code to repeal and replace itself.145  
Thus, “[t]he Bankruptcy Code of 1968 does not work an implied repeal of 
the FDCPA, any more than the latter Act implicitly repeals itself.”146  
Lastly, the Bankruptcy Code fails to address the consumer protection 
concerns the FDCPA seeks to remedy and cannot be said to be “clearly 
intended as a substitute” to the FDCPA.147  Therefore, under the second 
theory of implied repeal, the Bankruptcy Code cannot repeal the FDCPA 
in its entirety; thus, the FDCPA should remain applicable during 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
The only other “well-settled” method of repeal by implication occurs 
when the provisions within the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict.148  
Repeals by implication are not favored.149  As a general rule, an 
irreconcilable conflict exists where the two acts are “repugnant in any of 
their provisions[.]”150  “Repugnance” is defined as “the quality or fact of 
being contradictory or inconsistent[.]”151  Therefore, in order to find a 
repeal by implication, provisions of the later statute must contradict or be 
inconsistent with provisions in the earlier statute.152  Even if this were 
applicable, the FDCPA would be repealed only to the extent that its 
provisions are in irreconcilable conflict with provision in the Bankruptcy 
Code.153  This means the entire Bankruptcy Code is not invalidated by 
conflicting provisions in the FDCPA.  Rather, the specific provisions in 
the Bankruptcy Code that conflict with the FDCPA are inoperable only to 
the extent they are unable to be enforced together.154 
The next section of this Note will explore the specific provisions of 
 
bankruptcies, but does not provide any guidance or authority over consumers who are not in 
bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112 (2015). 
144.  Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503. 
145.  If Congress intended to repeal the Bankruptcy Code in enacting the FDCPA, then 
it would have likely done so expressly, as it did in 1978.  See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (establishing a uniform law on the subject of bankruptcies). 
146.  Randolph, 368 F.3d at 732. 
147.  Kline v. Mortg. Elec. Sec. Sys., 659 F. Supp. 2d 940, 950 (S.D. Ohio, 2009).  The 
Bankruptcy Code does not govern abusive, deceptive, and unfair acts and practices in 
connection with attempting to collect a debt where the consumer is not in bankruptcy, whereas 
the FDCPA does.  Id.  See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112 (2015); cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p. 
(2015). 
148.  Posadas, 296 U.S. at 504. 
149.  Id. at 503. 
150.  Id. at 504. 
151.  Repugnance, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
152.  Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503. 
153.  Id.  See infra Part II.C. 
154.  Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503. 
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the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA that are most frequently relied upon 
when making an implicit repeal argument.  The following section will 
argue that statutory provisions are not in conflict.155  Lastly, even if 
statutory provisions are contradictory, they are not in irreconcilable 
conflict and should complement, rather than contradict, each other. 
C. Conflicting Provisions 
Because the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA cover different 
subjects,156 repeal by implication may occur only where provisions in the 
two acts are in irreconcilable conflict.157  “Irreconcilable” means the 
provisions are “impossible to reconcile[,]”158 or in other words, impossible 
to “make consistent or congruent.”159  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has expanded on this notion, holding it is not enough to show 
“affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary” provisions.160  Further, it is not 
enough that each statute’s provision produces a different result in its 
application.161  Therefore, in order for implied repeal to occur, a provision 
in the Bankruptcy Code (the later act) must first conflict with a provision 
in the FDCPA (the earlier act) and second, the conflict must be 
irreconcilable.162  This Note will first argue that the FDCPA complements, 
rather than conflicts with, the Bankruptcy Code.  Second, this Note will 
argue that even if courts were to accept the argument that a conflict exists, 
any alleged conflicts between the statutory provisions are certainly not 
irreconcilable and the two may be enforced together, at least to some 
extent, as the United States Supreme Court encourages.163 
The most convincing arguments that provisions in the FDCPA 
irreconcilably conflict with provisions in the Bankruptcy Code cite to 
conflicts between the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-stay 
provision and proof of claim provisions.164  Several courts have held that 
because provisions in the FDCPA require contact with the consumer, 
where the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-stay provision forbids contact 
 
155.  See infra Part II.C.   
156.  The Bankruptcy Code governs bankruptcies, while the FDCPA addresses abusive 
debt-collection practices.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112 (2015); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e (2015).   
157.  Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503.   
158.  Irreconcilable, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
159.  Reconcilable, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
160.  Wood v. U.S., 41 U.S. 342, 363 (1842).   
161.  Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976).   
162.  Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503.   
163.  See infra Part II.A.   
164.  Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2014); 
Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 2013).   
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with the consumer, the two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict.165  Other 
courts have found irreconcilable conflict where the Bankruptcy Code 
allows creditors to file invalid or stale proofs of claim, shifting the burden 
to the consumer debtor to object,166 whereas the “FDCPA governs debt 
collection in or out of court; it does not allow debt collectors to use 
litigation as a vehicle for abusive and unfair practices that the Act 
forbids.”167 
1. The Automatic-Stay Provision Is Not in Conflict with the 
Validation-Notice Requirement 
The automatic-stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code is hardly in 
conflict with the validation notice requirement of the FDCPA.168  From 
the moment a bankruptcy petition is filed, a debtor is protected by the 
automatic-stay injunction, which prohibits a broad range of debt-
collection activity, including, but not limited to, “any act to create, perfect, 
or enforce any lien against property of the estate”169 and “any act to 
collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.”170  The validation notice 
requirement of the FDCPA mandates that debt collectors must send a 
consumer a written validation notice “[w]ithin five days after the initial 
communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any 
debt.”171  The validation notice must contain the amount of the debt, the 
name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, and a statement advising 
the debtor how to proceed in the event the validity of the debt is 
disputed.172 
The argument that these two provisions conflict is flawed because in 
order to accept this argument, one must assume the two provisions would 
be in effect concurrently.173 Under the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-stay 
provision, both creditors and debt collectors are strictly prohibited from 
contacting consumer debtors altogether once a bankruptcy petition is 
 
165.  Simon, 732 F.3d at 280.   
166.  11 U.S.C. § 502(a)–(b) (2012). 
167.  Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 770 F.3d 443, 451 (6th Cir. 2004), 
as amended (Dec. 11, 2014).  
168.  11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2015). 
169.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (2015). 
170.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2015).   
171.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2015).   
172.  Id.   
173.  The Ninth Circuit made this incorrect assumption, and failed “to understand how [a 
debt collector] could comply with FDCPA § 1692g and its various notice and informational 
requirements because those provisions conflict with the [Bankruptcy] Code and Rules.”  In re 
Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225, 239 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled in part by In re Sia, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 172126 (D.N.J. 2015). 
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filed.174  Courts that find this argument persuasive fail to consider that the 
FDCPA’s validation notice requirement attaches only where the debt 
collector has already sent an initial communication to the debtor in an 
attempt to collect the debt within the preceding five days.175  When a 
debtor files bankruptcy, the initial communication described in the 
FDCPA is already barred by the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-stay 
injunction, thus negating the requirement that a validation notice be 
sent.176  Therefore, this apparent inconsistency only becomes an issue 
where the initial communication to collect a debt is sent within the 
preceding four days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.177 
In most cases, debt collectors would not need to send a validation 
notice under the FDCPA because they are unable to initiate 
communication in the first place under the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-
stay provision.178  However, a conflict exists during a small four-day time 
period before the petition is filed, where debt collectors may legally 
communicate with the debtor under both statutes, but are barred from 
sending an FDCPA validation once the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-stay 
injunction is enforced.179  However, evidence of contradictions between 
statutory provisions does not indicate total categorical preclusion, as the 
Ninth Circuit concluded in In re Chaussee.180  At best, it indicates a 
window of time during which conflict between the two might arise, which 
may only lead to repeal by implication in provisions where conflict is 
irreconcilable.181 
This small conflict does not justify a finding that the provisions are 
so different that agreement is not possible.182  Under the FDCPA, when a 
debt collector knows the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect 
to the debt, the debt collector is prohibited from contacting the debtor 
 
174.  11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2015).   
175.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2015).   
176.  11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2015).   
177.  Since the initial communication is only prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code’s 
automatic-stay provision after filing bankruptcy, debtors who have not yet filed may potentially 
receive initial communication before filing.  11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2015).  This may admittedly 
cause a conflict where the debtor is initially contacted immediately before the filing of their 
bankruptcy petition.  In this case, the FDCPA would require the validation notice be sent within 
the next five days, where the automatic-stay injunction would forbid it.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g 
(2015); 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2015).   
178.  11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2015).   
179.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2015); 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2015).   
180.  In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225 (9th Cir. 2008).   
181.  United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).   
182.  See Preclude, MIRRIAM WEBSTER, supra note 134; see also United States v. 
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). 
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directly.183  Therefore, one simple solution would be to send the validation 
notice to the debtor’s attorney once the filing of a bankruptcy petition bars 
him from communicating directly with the debtor.184  This conflict could 
also be easily addressed in the same manner conflicting provisions within 
the Bankruptcy Code are dealt with.  For example, under the Bankruptcy 
Code, debtors have the ability to reaffirm the debts owed to secured 
creditors.185  In cases of reaffirmation, creditors are still able to 
communicate with debtors under some circumstances, when necessary.186 
If courts are ultimately not persuaded that either of these solutions 
allow for coexistence of the two provisions, irreconcilable conflict triggers 
an implied repeal.187  Even if an irreconcilable conflict exists, implied 
repeal operates to repeal the FDCPA only to the extent that the provision 
is in irreconcilable conflict with the provision in the Bankruptcy Code.188  
Therefore, in the small four-day window where the Bankruptcy Code’s 
automatic-stay injunction cannot operate simultaneously with the 
FDCPA’s validation notice requirement, the provision of the earlier 
statute (the FDCPA) is repealed, meaning that in this circumstance, 
validation would no longer be required.189 
2. Proofs of Claim Provision is Not in Conflict with FDCPA 
Provisions 
Another commonly cited “discrepancy”190 between the Bankruptcy 
Code and the FDCPA involves the handling of proofs of claim.191  Many 
courts find an unexplainable overlap in provisions where the Bankruptcy 
 
183.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2015). 
184.  This solution would be compliant with both Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA 
requirements.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2015); 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2015).  Further, where the 
validation notice is sent during this time period, a debt collector who is genuinely unaware that 
the debtor is represented by counsel with respect to the debt may still escape liability by 
invoking the bona fide error defense.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2015).  The bona fide error defense 
states that  
[a] debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter 
if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of [the] evidence that the violation 
was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the 
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.  
Id.   
185.  “Reaffirmation” is an agreement to continue repayment of debt and has the opposite 
effect of discharging it in the bankruptcy proceeding.  11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1322 (2015).   
186.  See generally In re Jamo, 283 F.3d 392 (1st Cir. 2002).   
187.  Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).   
188.  Id. 
189.  See id. 
190.  This Section argues that this commonly cited “discrepancy” is not actually a 
discrepancy and explains how the allegedly conflicting provisions are able to coexist. 
191.  See Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Code “contemplates a creditor filing a proof of claim on a time-barred 
debt . . . .”192  Section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states a proof of 
claim is “allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.”193  Section 502(b) 
then goes on to state that courts “shall allow such claim in such amount, 
except to the extent that such claim is unenforceable against the 
debtor . . . .”194  The Bankruptcy Code also provides remedies, which 
include “revocation of fraudulent proofs of claim and the court’s contempt 
power.”195  Some courts are still not persuaded Congress intended for 
debtors to “be permitted to bypass the procedural safeguards in the Code 
in favor of asserting potentially more lucrative claims under the 
FDCPA.”196  But courts taking this view fail to consider that allowing an 
FDCPA claim during bankruptcy does not necessarily require the debtor 
to “bypass” the remedial scheme of the bankruptcy code, since both 
statutes provide a disincentive to filing an invalid or unenforceable proof 
of claim.197  This notion that debtors are allowed to object, therefore 
disallowing the creditor from taking part in the bankruptcy estate 
liquidation or repayment plan, seems consistent with, rather than 
contradictory to, the FDCPA.198 
Under the repeal by implication analysis, repeal by implication may 
occur where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict.199  In 
this provision, the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to object to any invalid 
or unenforceable proof of claim to have it eliminated from the bankruptcy 
proceeding.200 In some circumstances, this same behavior may also rise to 
the level of abusive, deceptive, and unfair acts or practices in connection 
with an attempt to collect a debt under the FDCPA.201  This does not 
evidence a conflict.  Simply put, a debtor in bankruptcy may stop creditors 
from taking part in their bankruptcy by objecting under the Bankruptcy 
Code, and if the proof of claim was also abusive, the debtor may sue for 
 
192.  Id. at 95 (quoting B-Real, LLC v. Rogers, 405 B.R. 428, 431–32 (M.D. La. 2009); 
11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a)–(b) (2015). 
193.  11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a)–(b) (2015) (emphasis added). 
194.  11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2015) (emphasis added). 
195.  Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96. 
196.  Id. (quoting Gray-Mapp v. Sherman, 100 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 (N.D. Ill. 1999); see 
generally Baldwin v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nicols & Clark, LLC, No. 98-C-4280, 
1999 WL 284788, at *7 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing In re Clark, 172 B.R. 701, 705 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 
197.  See generally Baldwin, 1999 WL 284788, at *2–5 (adopting a preclusion analysis, 
but failing to address whether the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code are in irreconcilable 
conflict); See also Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96. 
198.  11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a)–(b) (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2015). 
199.  Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). 
200.  11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a)–(b) (2015). 
201.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (2015). 
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damages under the FDCPA.202  To hold otherwise is to fall into the exact 
trap Justice Story cautioned against when he stated, “it is not sufficient [to 
find an implied repeal by establishing] that subsequent law covers some 
or even all of the cases provided for by it (the prior act); for they may be 
merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary.”203 
Some courts still are reluctant to allow for recovery under both 
statutes simultaneously for fear that it authorizes the debtor to “double 
dip,” and thus they hold that “[t]here is no need to protect debtors who are 
already under the protection of the bankruptcy court, and there is no need 
to supplement the remedies afforded by bankruptcy itself.”204  This 
interpretation is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s 
approach which encourages courts to give effect to both federal statutes 
when possible205 even when they are “merely affirmative, or cumulative, 
or auxiliary.”206 
Lastly, even in courts that interpret remedies under both statutes to 
be a conflict, the later act only repeals the earlier act to the extent the 
provisions are in irreconcilable conflict.207  This indicates the Bankruptcy 
Code’s proof of claim provision shields debt collectors from FDCPA 
claims only while the debtor remains under the protection of the 
Bankruptcy Code.208  Adopting this approach is problematic because it is 
more time-consuming, difficult to administer,209 and would be 
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s goal “to bring together and adjust 
all of the rights and duties of creditors and embarrassed debtors alike”210 
by failing to address FDCPA claims simply because a person is in 
bankruptcy.  This cannot be the intended effect.  Courts that allow for 
FDCPA claims to be brought for invalid proofs of claim have also 
reasoned that this practice is analogous to filing a stale lawsuit and should 
be treated the same.211 
 
202.  11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a)–(b) (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2015). 
203.  Wood v. U.S., 41 U.S. 342, 362–63 (1842). 
204.  Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010). 
205.  Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Branch v. Smith, 
538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)). 
206.  Wood, 41 U.S. at 362–63. 
207.  Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). 
208.  The two statutes may only conflict when they are both in effect at the same time.  
Id. 
209.  The Second Circuit attempted to adopt this approach, in denying FDCPA protection 
to a debtor during bankruptcy, but allowing recovery to a different debtor after discharge.  See 
Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010); This does not create a 
bright-line rule that provides any guidance, as it is unclear when remedies under the Bankruptcy 
Code end and remedies under the FDCPA begin.  Id. 
210.  MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1996). 
211.  See Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) (adopting 
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a. Invalid proofs of claim analogous to filing a stale lawsuit in court 
The Crawford court has been both praised and criticized for taking a 
different path to reach the proposed result.212  Rather than look to the 
statutes themselves, Crawford adopted the approach of analogizing the 
filing of an invalid proof of claim to the filing of a lawsuit on a time-barred 
debt in state court, an act consistently held to violate the FDCPA.213  The 
Eleventh Circuit based its decision on the notion that filing a lawsuit in 
state court on a time-barred debt would likely subject a debt collector to 
FDCPA liability, and therefore a stale proof of claim should as well.214  
Federal “courts have uniformly held that a debt collector’s threatening to 
sue on a time-barred debt and/or filing a time-barred suit in state court to 
recover that debt violates §§1692e and 1692f.”215 
Stale lawsuits to collect consumer debts are unfair under the FDCPA 
for three reasons: (1) few unsophisticated consumers would know about 
the statute of limitations and would therefore fail to raise a statute of 
limitations defense; (2) the passage of time makes it harder for a consumer 
to remember the circumstances surrounding the debt and its validity; and 
(3) the delay in suing after the statute of limitations period has run makes 
it more likely that the debtor will have disposed of or misplaced personal 
records regarding the debt.216  The filing of a stale lawsuit in state court 
may not be as wholly analogous to filing a stale proof of claim in 
bankruptcy court as Crawford suggests,217 but it is still unfair under the 
FDCPA for the same reasons.  Like the filing of a stale lawsuit, the filing 
of a stale “proof of claim creates the misleading impression to the debtor 
that the debt collector can legally enforce the debt.”218  The least-
sophisticated consumer probably will not know a claim is time-barred, 
both in state court and in bankruptcy court, and will likely fail to object to 
such a claim.219  The passage of time makes it less likely for a debtor to 
remember the circumstances surrounding the debt and more likely that 
personal documentation is no longer accessible.220  This makes it difficult 
for a consumer debtor to defend against a time-barred claim, whether the 
 
the approach outlined in Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 287 (7th Circ. 2013)). 
212.  See Dant, supra note 8. 
213.  Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1261 (adopting the approach outlined in Phillips v. Asset 
Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 287 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
214.  Id. at 1259. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Id. (citing Phillips, 736 F.3d at 1079). 
217.  Dant, supra note 8, at 1078. 
218.  Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1261. 
219.  Id. 
220.  Id. 
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claim is in state court or in bankruptcy court.221  To find otherwise would 
be contrary to the purpose of the FDCPA.222 
Allowing recovery for an FDCPA violation while a debtor is in 
bankruptcy is also necessary to achieve the underlying purpose behind 
statutes of limitation.223  Statutes of limitation are meant to “protect 
defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the 
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether 
by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance 
of documents, or otherwise.”224  As Crawford points out, the same is true 
in the bankruptcy context.225  To place the burden on the debtor to prove 
the invalidity of the claim would be contrary to the objective of statutes of 
limitation.226  This same notion of unfairness may even be more apparent 
in a bankruptcy context, where debtors often are pro se, filing without the 
guidance or assistance of legal counsel.227 
Further, state courts generally allow claims to be brought even if 
time-barred, just like the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic allowance 
provision allows a time-barred proof of claim to be filed unless the debtor 
objects.228  Allowing an FDCPA claim for time-barred proofs of claim 
would also eliminate the risk of unnecessary consumption of energy and 
resources in a bankruptcy proceeding, just as it does in state court.229 
In sum, neither of the two most frequently referenced provisions 
preclude debtors from making an FDCPA claim while in bankruptcy.230  
Even where minor conflicts exist, the conflicts are not irreconcilable and 
thus the statutes can coexist.231  In situations where provisions do conflict, 
courts are authorized to imply a repeal of only the conflicting provision in 
the earlier statute, which still allows for recovery, but would merely 
negate procedural requirements under the FDCPA.232  Lastly, setting aside 
the preclusion argument to adopt a different approach still produces the 
 
221.  Id. 
222.  The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by 
debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action 
to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2015). 
223.  Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1260. 
224.  Id. (quoting R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)). 
225. Id.   
226.  See Dant, supra note 8, at 1078; see also Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1261. 
227.  “Pro Se” is defined as “[f]or oneself; on one’s own behalf; without a lawyer.”  Pro 
Se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
228.  Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1260. 
229.  Id. 
230.  See supra Part II.C.2. 
231.  See supra Part II.C.2. 
232.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
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same result: FDCPA claims are not precluded during bankruptcy.233  The 
last subsection of this Part will demonstrate how the new approach will 
work in a practical scenario.234 
D. Betty, Bankruptcy, and the Proposed Approach 
Remember Betty, the Chapter 13 debtor who was previously unable 
to proceed with an FDCPA claim after a debt collector attempted to collect 
a duplicative debt by filing an invalid proof of claim?235  Now imagine her 
in a jurisdiction that has adopted the new approach, allowing her to assert 
a private right of action against the collector under the FDCPA.  Rather 
than having to reopen the bankruptcy to initiate an adversary 
proceeding,236 Betty now carries a sword that will allow her to recover 
something the Bankruptcy Code does not provide: the monetary damages 
that Congress intended the FDCPA to award.237  Best of all, under the low 
standard of the “least sophisticated consumer,”238 Betty does not have to 
worry about incurring additional expenses, because she is more likely to 
prevail, and will be awarded attorney’s fees under the FDCPA.239  This 
result seems more consistent with congressional intent and the United 
States Supreme Court’s instruction where two federal statutes conflict. 
Many courts believe Betty is not in need of any additional protections 
because the FDCPA violations usually do not result in monetary 
damages.240  However, those courts fail to consider that money isn’t 
everything—the harassment, embarrassment, and anxiety that comes with 
filing a bankruptcy may be exponentially multiplied by FDCPA 
violations.  This protection is necessary to give the FDCPA its full effect. 
 
233.  See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
234.  See infra Part II.D. 
235.  See supra Part I.D. 
236.  An “adversary proceeding” is “[a] lawsuit that is brought within a bankruptcy 
proceeding, governed by special procedural rules, and based on conflicting claims usu[ally] 
between the debtor (or the trustee) and a creditor or other interested party . . . .”  Adversary 
Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  In practice, adversary proceedings 
are generally not covered by the flat fee debtors pay to file bankruptcy and are often billed 
additionally by hourly rates.  The Bankruptcy Code does not allow a debtor to recover attorney’s 
fees.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301–362k(1) (2015). 
237.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301–362k(1) (2015); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2015). 
238.  To determine “whether a debt collector’s practice is deceptive within the meaning 
of the [FDCPA], courts apply an objective test based on the understanding of the ‘least 
sophisticated consumer.’”  Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d. Cir. 1993).  
239.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2015). 
240.  Owens, 832 F.3d at 734. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits correctly 
concluded that the Bankruptcy Code does not preempt the FDCPA in 
situations where both may apply.241  Where courts are able to comply with 
the provisions of two federal statutes simultaneously, they are required to 
do so.242  An analysis of the FDCPA against the backdrop of the 
Bankruptcy Code shows no express contradiction or “irreconcilable 
conflict” necessary to give rise to the inference of statutory repeal.243  
Further, where irreconcilable conflict exists among provisions, courts 
should only interpret an implied repeal of the conflicting provisions and 
still enforce the FDCPA when they can.244  Not only is this consistent with 
the purpose of both statutes, but when analogized with other holdings, it 
is clear the two should coexist.245 
In order to achieve the desired effect of the FDCPA, the United States 
Supreme Court should adopt the usual standard of FDCPA violations 
regardless of bankruptcy status.  The circuit split will be eradicated in the 
foreseeable future.246  Only time will tell which end of the spectrum the 
Supreme Court wants all courts to be on.  Betty is one small fish in a big 
sea of debtors whose protections under the Bankruptcy Code fall short of 
the full redress the FDCPA intended to allow.247 
Both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA strive to provide the 
utmost protection to consumers who find themselves in financial binds.248  
Limiting debtors to relief under the Bankruptcy Code where both statutes 
apply results in the same confusion circuits that have adopted this 
approach sought to eliminate by choosing only one statute.249 
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